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Abstract—We consider the design of external inputs to achieve
a control objective on the opinions, represented by scalars, in
a social network. The opinion dynamics follow a variant of
the discrete-time Friedkin-Johnsen model. We first consider two
minimum cost optimal control problems over a finite interval
(T0, T ), T0 > 0—(1) TF where opinions at all nodes should
exceed a given τ, and (2) GF where a scalar function of the
opinion vector should exceed a given τ. For both problems we first
provide a Pontryagin maximum principle (PMP) based control
function when the controllable nodes are specified. We then show
that both these problems exhibit the turnpike property where
both the control function and the state vectors stay near their
equilibrium for a large fraction of the time. This property is then
used to choose the optimum set of controllable nodes. We then
consider a third system, MF, which is a cost-constrained optimal
control problem where we maximize the minimum value of a
scalar function of the opinion vector over (T0, T ). We provide
a numerical algorithm to derive the control function for this
problem using non-smooth PMP based techniques. Extensive
numerical studies illustrate the three models, control techniques
and corresponding outcomes.
Index Terms—opinion control, opinion dynamics, optimal con-
trol, Pontryagin maximum principle, state-constrained optimal
control, turnpike property.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The process of opinion formation and learning by individu-
als over social networks has been researched for many decades
now. Although these are, in general, complex processes, deter-
mined by the nature of influences on the individuals over the
social network, many simple and useful mathematical models
have been proposed and studied. Most popular models have
the following structure. The social network is described by
a weighted directed graph in which the nodes of the graph
represent the agents or social players and the weighted edges
represent the interactions between the agents. The opinion of
an agent is modeled as a scalar quantity associated with the
node corresponding to that agent. These scalar quantities could
represent the strength of an orientation towards a subject or
a topic, in which case the range of valid values of the scalar
could be a subset of the real numbers. The scalar quantity
could also represent a subjective probability associated with
some chance event, in which case the range would be a subset
of [0, 1]. The opinions at the nodes evolve over time according
to a social interaction model that is described by a discrete
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time evolution equation with the opinion at node i at time
t+ 1, say xi(t+ 1), being a function of the opinions of itself
and of its neighbors on the social network at time t. Vector of
opinions at the nodes and continuous time systems have also
been considered in the literature.
The classical opinion evolution, or opinion dynamics, equa-
tion is the French-DeGroot model defined by
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j
Ai,jxj(t)
where Aij is the weight of edge (i, j). A continuous time
version of this model is called the Abelson model and is given
by the following differential equation model.
x˙i(t) =
∑
j
Ai,j (xj(t)− xi(t))
There are of course several variations of the French-
DeGroot model. The Friedkin-Johnsen model introduces a
susceptibility parameter where the opinion at a node evolves
as a convex combination of the neighbors’ opinions and a
native prejudice. In the Hegselmann-Krause model only a set
of ‘trusted’ neighbors (defined as neighbors whose opinions
do not differ by more than a threshold) can influence a
node. In Taylor’s model, the neighbor’s opinions and a set
of static sources, or communication channels, can influence
the scalar opinions at the nodes. A reasonably comprehensive
introduction to the preceding models and their analyses are
available in [1], [2]. Another excellent reference is [3]. In this
paper we will consider a variation of the Friedkin-Johnsen
model and will be described in more detail in the next section.
B. Related Work
The key characteristic of the models that are surveyed in
[1]–[3] is the absence of any influences or inputs external to
the social network. Further, all the nodes behave similarly in
the updating of their opinions. Thus the analysis objective in
these early works is in the asymptotic behavior of the opinions
xi(t) and the convergence rate to the asymptotic values.
There is now a growing interest in analyzing the effect
on opinion formation in the presence of inputs external to
the social network; see e.g., [4], [5]. The objective of these
works is, like before, to analyze the asymptotic behavior of the
opinions under different models of the external inputs. These
studies are prompted by the need to understand how campaigns
on social media influence the group behavior of a social
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2network. Another variation is to consider the situation where
some of the nodes behave differently than others; specifically,
a small number of the nodes are stubborn and do not change
their opinions while the rest of the nodes change their opinions
according to the usual opinion dynamics model. Example
models and analyses are in [6]–[9]. Once again, the interest is
in the analysis to study the asymptotic behavior.
A key departure from analysis to design towards achieving
a desired objective was, to the best of our knowledge, first
considered in [10], [11]. They considered choosing the set of
stubborn nodes and their opinion values so as to converge to
the predetermined consensus at the fastest rate subject to cost
constraints. A similar objective for the case of nodes having
binary valued opinions is considered in [12]. In this paper
we consider the design of external control inputs to achieve a
desired control objective on the opinion values—of achieving
a desired opinion profile over the control horizon.
We conclude this discussion by pointing out that there are
some superficial similarities between the control of opinions as
studied in this paper and controlled flow of information using
epidemic models on graphs, e.g., [13], [14]. We reiterate that
they are not related. The work in [15] has goals most similar
to ours but there are key differences—different objectives
and different constraints. Our interest is in controlling the
behaviour over the entire control period, [15] is interested in
the state at the end of the period. For their key result, [15] uses
a continuous time model and invokes the Pontryagin maximum
principle (PMP) to show that the control is bang-bang.
C. Our Contributions
In the first part of this work, we consider the problem
of maintaining the opinion levels above a predetermined
threshold (ferment1) level at all the network nodes at all times
of a finite time horizon, after allowing for a small startup
period. This is to be achieved by control agents external to
the social network that can influence opinion at some nodes.
The control nodes change their opinions according to a control
schedule and are not influenced by other nodes. Equivalently,
some nodes inject ‘external opinions’ into the network. This
model is a natural extension to the goals of [11], [12].
The preceding control objective is motivated by campaigns
that need to achieve a minimum interest level, or a ‘mind-
share,’ in the population This interest level is modeled as a
scalar value at the nodes. Another motivation is the many
studies that have reported use of online social networks to
create social ferment to facilitate certain actions2. There have
also been news reports about online social networks wanting
to counter such activities 3.
In the preceding, ferment is to be maintained at minimum
cost. In the second part of the paper, consider the objective of
maximizing the minimum of a scalar function of the opinion
1Here, ferment is used to mean “a state of intense activity or agitation. See
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ferment.
2For an example news story, see
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-
genocide.html
3https://www.businesstoday.in/buzztop/buzztop-feature/heres-how-whatsapp-
plans-to-fight-fake-news-in-india/story/309163.html
vector over a finite time horizon, subject to a given total cost
constraint for the period.
Our contributions and the organization of the rest of the
paper are as below.
In Section II we set up the notation and describe the opinion
dynamics model, a variation of the Friedkin-Johnsen model. In
this model, in the absence of the control inputs, the opinions at
each node decays to a node-specific quiescent level. We also
set up the optimal control problem of maintaining ferment
in the social network at times {T0, . . . , T} at minimum cost
when nodes that can receive the control inputs are provided.
In Section III we present a technique to determine an optimal
control trajectory based on the Pontryagin maximum principle
(PMP). In Section IV we show that the optimal control
trajectory has the turnpike property, i.e., as the time horizon
T becomes large, the states and the control will be near
their equilibrium level for all but a vanishing fraction of time
instants. This property enables us to pose the choice of the
controllable nodes as a constrained optimization problem. This
optimization problem, its solution under a relaxation, and the
possible heuristics are described in Section V. Section VI
considers the max-min problem of maximizing the minimum
of a scalar function of the opinion vector over a finite time
horizon, subject to a given total cost constraint and describes
the numerical procedure for deriving a control function for
this problem using non-smooth PMP based techniques. In
Section VII, numerical simulations are used to illustrate the
properties of the cost of maintaining ferment on three different
graph models that are widely used to describe social networks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we first describe the opinion dynamics model,
followed by the control objectives. Toward this, we employ
the following notation. R denotes the real numbers, R+ the
positive real numbers, and N the positive integers. In is the
n × n identity matrix. The i-th entry of vector v is denoted
by vi. For a, b ∈ Rn, the relation a ≥ b denotes the entry-
wise inequality ai ≥ bi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The transpose
of matrix M is denoted by Mᵀ. For matrix B ∈ Rn×m, the
norm ‖B‖0 denotes the total number of non-zero entries in B.
The dot product of vectors u and v is denoted by 〈u, v〉
A. Opinion Dynamics
A set of n agents, denoted by N , are connected over a
social network. Agent i has a positive scalar-valued opinion,
modeled as the state xi(t) ∈ R at time t. The agents interact
with their neighbors over the social network and evolve their
opinions with time. The social interactions are modeled by
the weighted edges of the network graph G = (N , E) with
the edge set E modeling the interaction among the agents. We
assume that the graph G is strongly connected.
The opinion (state) dynamics in the network for each node
i, in the absence of external control inputs, is governed by the
following variation of the Friedkin-Johnsen model law.
xi(t+1) = qi+
∑
j:(i,j)∈E
aij (xj(t)− qj)+aii (xi(t)− qi) (1)
3Here qi, qi ≥ 0, is the quiescent opinion of agent i (it could
be the final state from an exogenous interaction process), aij ,
0 ≤ aij < 1, models the strength of the influence of opinion
of agent j on that of agent i, and aii models the stubbornness
of agent i. We assume
∑n
j=1 aij < 1 for all i, i.e., the weight
matrix A = [[aij ]] is substochastic. Under this assumption, at
any time, the opinion of each agent has two components—
a constant native opinion and an additive perturbation due to
interactions with neighbours. In the absence of external inputs,
all agents regress to their native opinion. In the context of our
motivating scenarios, we believe that this is a more natural
model. The vector form of (1) can be written as
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + (In −A)q. (2)
Here x(t) is a column vector with xi(t) as i-th component,
q is the column vector of quiescent opinions, and In is the
identity matrix. It can checked that, without a control input,
x(t)→ q.
There are m control sources, each of which can inject
control inputs into exactly one controllable node. Matrix
B ∈ Rn×m maps control sources to controllable nodes with
bij = 1 if control j is connected to node i and
∑
i bij = 1.
We also remark that bij could in general be an arbitrary real
number. Making it take values in {0, 1} allows us to provide
additional results.
Our interest is in maintaining ferment over the finite time
horizon {T0, . . . , T}, through control inputs injected at the
controllable nodes starting at time t = 0. Toward this, define
the map f
Rn×Rm 3 (ξ, µ) 7→ f(ξ, µ) := Aξ+Bµ+ (In−A)q ∈ Rn.
(3)
In the presence of the control inputs, the opinion dynamics
take the following form.
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), u(t)) for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 (4)
Here u(t) ∈ Rm is the column vector of control actions
applied at time instant t. In the rest of the paper, for brevity,
we denote the state-action trajectory (x(t), u(t))T−1t=0 by (x, u).
Assumption 1. We assume that the dynamics (4) are contin-
uous and controllable.
Assumption 1 is natural in this context. Further, we assume
that the control actions have a convex cost. This is reasonable
because of the law of diminishing returns; in this context this
means that effecting marginal change becomes harder with
increasing values. To anchor the discussion, we define the
following cost function on the control inputs
Rm 3 µ 7→ c(µ) := µᵀRµ ∈ R. (5)
Here R ∈ Rm×m is symmetric and positive definite.
B. Control Objectives
We view the problem from the point of view of the external
agent applying the control inputs and consider the following
three different, yet related, objectives—total ferment (TF),
group ferment (GF), and maxmin group ferment (MF). These
are detailed below.
In problem (TF), the objective is to have the opinion at
every node exceed a specific threshold for T0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Specifically, let τi be the minimum opinion level that needs to
be maintained at node i in the time interval {T0, . . . , T}, i.e.,
xi(t) ≥ τi, for all i and for all t ∈ {T0, . . . , T}. Let τ = [τi]
be the column vector of the thresholds. This imposes a state
constraint given by
x(t) ∈
{
Rn for t = 0, . . . , T0 − 1,
XTF for t = T0, . . . , T,
(6)
where XTF = {y ∈ Rn | y ≥ τ}.
The problem of minimizing the cost of (TF) is stated as an
optimal control problem in the following Lagrange form.
minimize
u
JTF (x¯, u) =
T−1∑
t=0
c (u(t))
subject to

state dynamics of (4),
state constraints of (6)
x(0) = x¯ ∈ Rn (given).
(TF)
Problem (TF) is a constrained LQ optimal control problem.
The cost of an optimal control-action trajectory for (TF) with
initial state x¯ will be denoted by J∗TF (x¯), i.e.,
J∗TF (x¯) := inf
u
JTF (x¯, u). (7)
For problem (GF) we first define the following function
of the opinions. Let ψ(x(t)) : Rn → R be an elementwise
increasing and differentiable function defined on the opinion
vector x. For (GF) we will require that ψ(x(t)) ≥ kn for
T0 ≤ t ≤ T and some 0 < k < 1. Define the set XGF :=
{y ∈ Rn | ψ(y) ≥ kn}. The state constraints for (GF) are
given by
x(t) ∈
{
Rn for t = 0, . . . , T0 − 1,
XGF for t = T0, . . . , T.
(8)
For ψ(·) any of the functions that are used in classification
problems could be used. In this paper, we will use the
following form of ψ. We choose this for the convenience in
computing its derivative.
ψ(x(t)) =
n∑
i=1
1
1 + e−a(xi(t)−τ)
With a suitable choice of a, the requirement that ψ(x(t)) > kn
for T0 ≤ t ≤ T , is a soft proxy for the requirement that
the fraction of nodes with opinions larger τ be above k. The
constrained LQ optimal control problem to achieve (GF) will
be as under.
minimize
u
JGF (x¯, u) =
T−1∑
t=0
c (u(t))
subject to

state dynamics (4),
state constraints (8)
x(0) = x¯ ∈ Rn (given).
(GF)
4The cost of an optimal control-action trajectory for (GF) with
initial state x¯ will be
J∗GF (x¯) := inf
u
JGF (x¯, u). (9)
The preceding two optimal control problems are minimum
cost formulations. An alternative would be to have a total
cost constraint. For such a situation we define a maxmin
optimization problem as follows. We will continue to use the
function ψ defined above and consider the following optimal
control problem.
maximize
u
minimum
t
ψ(x(t))
subject to

state dynamics (4),
JMF (x¯, u) =
∑T−1
t=0 c (u(t)) ≤ C
x(0) = x¯ ∈ Rn (given).
(MF)
In the next section we describe a method to obtain an
optimal control trajectory for problems (TF) and (GF) based
on the Pontryagin maximum principle. The optimal control
trajectory for problem (MF) will be described in Section VI.
III. OPTIMAL CONTROL VIA PONTRYAGIN MAXIMUM
PRINCIPLE
Let di be the number of hops between node i and the nearest
controllable node and let dmax = maxi di. Then we have the
following result.
Theorem 1. For T0 ≥ dmax, an optimal solution to the
problems (TF) and (GF) exists.
Proof. Since the cost function c(·) is near-monotone4, the state
constraints (6) and (8) are defined by closed relations, and
the dynamics (4) are continuous and controllable, there exists
a solution each of (TF) and (GF) provided the problem is
feasible. The feasibility of (TF) and (GF) is ensured by picking
T0 ≥ dmax since the corresponding state constraints (6) and (8)
can then be met for any initial state x¯ ∈ Rn by choosing a
large enough control input on the strongly connected network
graph G.
In the rest of the paper we will assume T  T0 ≥ dmax.
We use the necessary conditions of optimality from the dis-
crete time PMP [16] to solve the problems (TF) and (GF). The
costate variable is (λ(t))Tt=0 ∈ Rn. Define the Hamiltonian
R× Rn × N× Rn × Rm 3 (ν, ζ, ξ, µ) 7→ H(ν, ζ, ξ, µ)
:= ζᵀ (Aξ +Bµ+ (In −A)q)− νc (µ) ∈ R. (10)
Let (x∗(t))Tt=0 and (u
∗(t))T−1t=0 be an optimal state-action
trajectory that solves (TF) (similarly (GF)). PMP asserts that
there exists ν ∈ {0, 1}, a sequence (λ(t))Tt=0, and a sequence
(η(t))T−1t=T0 such that
λ(T ) = 0
λ(t− 1) = ∂
∂ξ
H (ν, λ(t), x∗(t), u∗(t))− η(t) (11)
4f : <n → < is near monotone if limt→∞ infy/∈B(0,r) f(y) = +∞.
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1, such that the scalar ν and the sequence
(λ(t))Tt=0 do not identically vanish. The Hamiltonian maxi-
mization condition asserts that an optimal control trajectory
(u∗(t))T−1t=0 must satisfy
d
dµ
νc (u∗(t)) = Bᵀλ(t)
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. For our quadratic cost function,
u∗(t) =
1
2ν
R−1Bᵀλ(t). (12)
From PMP, we have that ν either takes value 0 or 1. The case
of ν = 0 corresponds to singular (or abnormal) control.
Multiplier η(t) ∈ Rn takes only non-negative values by def-
inition. Further, from the complementary slackness condition
ηi(t)(xi(t)− τi) = 0
for i = 1, . . . , n, and t = T0, . . . , T, where τ is the required
ferment level.
The PMP provides necessary conditions for optimality in
the form of a well-posed system of boundary value problems.
There are several computational procedures that may be used
to obtain the optimal control sequences, including shooting
methods and homotopy based methods; see, e.g., [17] for a de-
tailed survey. Since most of these techniques are well known,
we will not elaborate on them any more. Instead, we will
explore the interesting turnpike phenomenon that the solutions
to (TF) and (GF) exhibit. This means that as time horizon T
becomes large, the optimal state-action trajectories stay close
to certain equilibrium pairs for all but a vanishing fraction of
time instants. This is investigated in the next section. We will
also see that this behavior allows us to simplify the optimal
control problem and provides mechanisms to choose most
efficient, and effective controllable nodes.
IV. TURNPIKE BEHAVIOR OF THE OPTIMAL CONTROL
In this section we demonstrate that under a mild condition
on T0, the optimal state-action trajectories for (TF) and (GF)
possess a turnpike property. Recall that the turnpike property
implies that as the time horizon T becomes large, the state
and control remain close to an equilibrium point for all but a
vanishing fraction of time instants for a discrete time optimal
control problem. It was first observed and studied by von
Neumann [18] and Dorfman et al., [19] in the context of
optimal control in economics. The turnpike property is closely
related to the system theoretic properties of dissipativity and
strict dissipativity. Dissipativity formalizes the condition that
a system cannot store more energy than supplied from the
outside; strict dissipativity requires, in addition, that some
energy is dissipated to the environment. The relation between
(strict) dissipativity and the turnpike property was first estab-
lished in [20] and later generalized in [21]. Specialized results
for constrained discrete time linear quadratic optimal control
problems are in [22]. We begin with the following definitions.
Definition 1. ([20]) A state-action pair (xe, ue) ∈ Rn × Rm
is called an equilibrium of (4) if f(xe, ue) = xe, and (xe, ue)
satisfies the given state and action constraints.
5For the dynamics in (4) and constraints in (6), the equi-
librium point for (TF) can be explicitly found by solving the
following convex problem.
minimize
ue
(ue)ᵀRue ,
subject to
{
xe = Axe +Bue + (In −A)q ,
xe ≥ τ .
(13)
The equilibrium for (GF) can be analogously defined.
Definition 2. ([22, Definition 2.4]) Let K be the set of contin-
uous and strictly increasing functions, i.e., K := {h : R+ →
R+|h is strictly increasing, continuous, & h(0) = 0}. Given
an equilibrium (xe, ue) of (4), the system (TF) (resp. (GF))
is called strictly dissipative with respect to supply rate Rm 3
u 7→ c(u) − c(ue) ∈ R if there exists a function g : X → R
bounded from below and a function ρ ∈ K such that for all
x ∈ X and u ∈ Rm satisfying f(x, u) ∈ X, we have
c(u)− c(ue) + g(x)− g(f(x, u)) ≥ ρ(‖x− xe‖). (14)
The system (TF) (resp. (GF)) is called dissipative if the
preceding property holds with ρ ≡ 0.
A readily verifiable and sufficient condition for the sys-
tem (TF) (resp. (GF)) to be strictly dissipative can be obtained
from ([22], Lemma 4.1) rewritten as below.
Lemma 1. Let c(·) be as defined in (5). Given a positive
definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n, there exists q ∈ Rn such that the
constrained LQ system (TF) or (GF) is strictly dissipative with
storage function g(x) = xᵀPx+ qᵀx if and only if the matrix
P −AᵀPA is positive definite.
To prove that system (TF) (resp. (GF)) is strictly dissipative,
we need to show that with P = In, In − AᵀA is positive
definite. However, since A is sub-stochastic by definition, it
follows that (TF) (resp. (GF)) is strictly dissipative.
We now define two variants of the turnpike property in
relation to (TF) and (GF), adapted from [21], [22]. Denote the
state trajectory under the action sequence u by (xu(t, x¯))Tt=0,
where x¯ is the initial state. Moreover, denote the total cost of
the state-action trajectory, ((xu(t, x¯))Tt=0, u) by JTF (x¯, u) as
in (TF) or by JGF (x¯, u) as in (GF).
Definition 3. The optimal control problems (TF) and (GF)
have the near-equilibrium turnpike property at an equilibrium
(xe, ue) if for each ρ > 0,  > 0, and δ > 0 there exists a
constant Cρ,,δ > 0 such that for all x¯ ∈ Rn with ‖x¯−xe‖ ≤ ρ,
all T ∈ N, and all trajectories (xu(t, x¯))Tt=0 satisfying
JTF (x¯, u) ≤ Tc(ue) + δ (15)
JGF (x¯, u) ≤ Tc(ue) + δ (16)
for some admissible u, with
#{t ∈ {T0, . . . , T} | ‖xu(t, x¯)− xe‖ > } ≤ Cρ,,δ. (17)
Definition 4. The optimal control problem given by (TF)
(resp. (GF)) has the turnpike property at an equilibrium
(xe, ue) of (4) on a set Xtp ⊂ Rn if for each compact
set K ⊂ Xtp and for each  > 0 there exists a constant
CK, > 0 such that for all x¯ ∈ K, all T ∈ N, the optimal
state trajectories (x∗(t))Tt=0 with initial value x¯ satisfy
#{t ∈ {T0, . . . , T} | ‖x∗(t)− xe‖ > } ≤ CK,. (18)
Definition 5. ([21]) The equilibrium xe is cheaply reachable
for system (TF) (resp. system (GF)) if there exists a constant
D > 0 with J∗TF (x¯) ≤ Tc(ue)+D (resp.J∗GF (x¯) ≤ Tc(ue)+
D) for all x¯ ∈ Rn and all T ∈ N.
In the preceding, #S denotes the number of elements of a
finite set S. These definitions imply the following. If a control
problem possesses the near-equilibrium turnpike property of
(Definition 3), then the trajectories for which the associated
cost is close to the steady state value stay in a neighborhood
of xe for most of the time. If a control problem possesses
the turnpike property (Definition 4), then the optimal state
trajectories stay in a neighborhood of xe most of the time.
They can be far from xe for at most a bounded number of
time instants, the bound being independent of T. We assume
that T is far from this bound. In fact, we will see from our
simulations that the trajectories approach xe very quickly.
From [20, Theorem 5.3] we know that strict dissipativity
implies near-equilibrium turnpike property. Since we have
shown that systems (TF) and (GF) are strictly dissipative, they
also have the near-equilibrium turnpike property. However, we
need the turnpike property as defined in Definition 4 to show
that the solution obtained using the PMP, i.e., an optimal state-
action trajectory, stays near the equilibrium. To this end, we
invoke [21, Lemma 3.9(b)] that is adapted as follows.
Lemma 2. If the optimal control problems (TF) and (GF)
exhibit the near-equilibrium turnpike property at (xe, ue) and
xe is cheaply reachable as defined in 5, then they also have
the turnpike property at (xe, ue).
For problems (TF) and (GF), the state constraints, x ∈ XTF
and x ∈ XGF respectively are not active for t ∈ {0, . . . , T0 −
1}. We use this property to prove that for T0 large enough,
xe is cheaply reachable as part of Theorem 2 below, which is
the main result.
Theorem 2. For T0 large enough, the optimal control prob-
lems (TF) and (GF) have the turnpike property.
Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that if xe is cheaply reach-
able from all possible initial states x¯, then the proof is
complete. Consider the control action trajectory u˜ that steers
the state from x(0) = x¯ to x(T0) = xe with minimum
cost, and thereafter it maintains the state at xe by applying
action ue. Here the parameter T0 is picked as the smallest
integer such that x(T0) = xe is achievable for all x¯ ∈ Rn.
For large enough T and a full rank Gramian matrix of the
system, such a T0 is guaranteed to exist for all initial states
x¯. This follows from the fact that the system with a full-
rank Gramian is controllable and no state-action constraints
are imposed on the system for t ≤ T0. The cost of u˜ is:
JTF (x¯, u˜) = (T−T0)c(ue)+D∗(x¯), where D∗(x¯) is the finite
cost of steering the system from x(0) = x¯ to x(T0) = xe in
6minimum cost. By definition, no control trajectory can have a
cost smaller than J∗TF (x¯) as defined in (7), which means:
J∗TF (x¯) ≤ JTF (x¯, u˜) = (T − T0)c(ue) +D∗(x¯). (19)
Which implies that
J∗TF (x¯) ≤ Tc(ue) +D∗(x¯). (20)
From the definition of cheap reachability (5), (20) ensures that
xe is cheaply reachable and finishes the proof for (TF). The
proof for (GF) follows similarly.
We remark that in the preceding proof, we did not need
bij ∈ {0, 1} and hence th theorem is valid for bij ∈ R.
However, the next section will require that bij ∈ {0, 1}.
Figs. 1 and 2 show a typical turnpike state and control action
trajectories for one instance of problem (TF) on the Zachary’s
Karate Club friendship network (see [23] for details of the
origin of this network) with n = 34 nodes, T = 100 time
steps and T0 = 10. The initial opinions are x¯i = 0.5 for all
i ∈ [1, . . . , 34]. The threshold is τ = 0.7 and the quiescent
level is q = 0 implying that the interest in the topic dies out
eventually in the absence of external control. There are m = 5
controllable nodes. It can be seen from the plots in Figs. 1
and 2 that the state-action trajectories stay at the equilibrium
for most time instants after t = T0.
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Fig. 1. A typical state trajectory for our optimal control problem. Each curve
depicts the state trajectory corresponding to a node of the underlying graph.
The experiment was done on the Zachary’s Karate Club friendship network,
with n = 34 nodes, T = 100 time step, and T0 = 10. The initial opinion
level is 0.5 on all nodes and the threshold level is τ = 0.7. There are m = 5
controllable nodes. Observe that the equilibrium values are reached shortly
after t = T0. This is evident from the fact that ‖x(12) − xe‖2/‖xe‖2 =
0.009 and ‖x(15)− xe‖2/‖xe‖2 = 0.00076.
V. SELECTING OPTIMAL CONTROLLABLE NODES
In the previous sections, we have studied the problem of
finding the minimum cost control when the m controllable
nodes are given. We now take the design view and allow the
influencing entity to choose the m controllable nodes. In the
discussion in this section, we restrict our attention to the case
of R = Im. Extensions to the case of a diagonal, positive R
is straightforward.
The problem of choosing m controllable nodes can also be
seen as designing the matrix B such that m of its entries are
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Fig. 2. A typical control action trajectory for our optimal control problem.
Each curve corresponds to the control actions at one of m = 5 controllable
nodes. The experimental setup is same as for Fig. 1. It can be observed that
the equilibrium values are reached shortly after t = T0.This is evident from
the fact that ‖u(12)−ue‖2/‖ue‖2 = 0.020 and ‖u(15)−ue‖2/‖ue‖2 =
0.00089.
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Fig. 3. A typical state trajectory for the Group Ferment optimal control
problem. Each curve depicts the state trajectory corresponding to a node of
the underlying graph. The experiment was done on the Zachary’s Karate Club
friendship network, with n = 34 nodes, T = 100 time step, and T0 = 10.
The initial opinion level is 0.5 on all nodes and the threshold level is τ = 0.7.
There are m = 5 controllable nodes. The values of parameters k and a are
0.5 and 1 respectively.
1 and others are 0. For the optimal control problem (TF), this
reduces to solving the following optimization problem.
minimize
B
J∗TF (x¯) =
T−1∑
t=0
‖u∗(t)‖22
subject to ‖B‖0 = m,
(21)
where, given a particular choice of B, (u∗(t))T−1t=0 denotes an
optimal control action trajectory for (TF). The optimization
for (GF) is analogous with J∗TF (x¯) being replaced by J
∗
GF (x¯).
It must be noted that for some graph topologies, there
may exist sets of controllable nodes for which an equilibrium
(xe, ue) does not exist. That is, there are valid matrices B†
such that there is no solution to xe = Axe+B†ue+(In−A)q
for xe ≥ τ . The following lemma (see Appendix A for proof)
gives us a condition as to when the k-th node is controllable.
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Fig. 4. A typical control action trajectory for the Group Ferment optimal
control problem. Each curve corresponds to the control actions at one of
m = 5 controllable nodes. The experimental setup is same as for Fig. 3.
Lemma 3. If the k-th column of (In−A)−1 has no zero entry,
then there exists a solution of (13) with only the k-th node
controllable.
Thus we make following assumption.
Assumption 2. There is atleast one column in (In − A)−1
with no zero entries.
From an extensive simulation study on a large number
of simple and complex graph topologies, we observed that
this property always holds. Thus we believe that it is not an
unreasonable assumption.
The state-action trajectories, before the equilibrium is
reached, are difficult to analyze and this makes solving the
above optimization problem hard. Recall that the turnpike
property of the optimal solutions of (TF) and (GF) implies
that the state-action trajectory (x∗(t), u∗(t))Tt=0 remains close
to an equilibrium point (xe, ue), for all but a small fraction
of the time steps in (T0, T ). The equilibrium point for (TF)
can be found explicitly via (13). Now observe that the equi-
librium (xe, ue) is independent of the initial state x¯ and the
final time T . Hence, rather than solve (21) exactly, we can
consider approximately solving the optimization problem in
(21), where we optimize the choice of controllable nodes to
minimize the cost incurred while the state is close to xe.
Informally, this ensures that the cost is minimized to keep
the system running in the equilibrium state. We expect this
to be a good approximation, especially as the time horizon T
becomes large. Thus the following optimization problem is a
good approximation for the exact solution of the problem of
optimally selecting controllable nodes for (TF).
minimize
B
‖ue‖22
subject to

xe = Axe +Bue + (In −A)q
xe ≥ τ
‖B‖0 = m.
(22)
For problem (GF), the second constraint is replaced by
φ(xe) ≥ kn.
The sparsity constraint on B in (22) makes the problem non-
convex and thus, hard to solve. The following two heuristics
are based on the above optimization problem.
A. Convex Relaxation
Here we remove the constraint on B in (22) and add
a term in the objective function corresponding to the l1
norm of the control, corresponding to the well-known LASSO
regularization technique [24]. We define an auxiliary variable
u˜e ∈ Rn to be used in place of Bue such that the resulting
problem formulation is:
minimize
u˜e
‖u˜e‖22 + µ‖u˜e‖1
subject to
{
xe = Axe + u˜e + (In −A)q
xe ≥ τ.
(23)
Let the solution of this convex problem be u˜∗. The controllable
nodes are chosen as the nodes corresponding to which u˜∗
has non-zero entries. The regularization coefficient µ can be
adapted to change the sparsity level desired from the solution.
However, it might not always be possible to match the sparsity
of the solution to m, the number of controllable nodes. In such
a scenario, one can select the top m elements of u˜∗ to select
the controllable nodes.
It must be noted here that such a convex relaxation heuristic
can be used only for problem (TF) and not for problem (GF).
This is because the set specifying the state constraints is
convex for problem (TF) and is generally non-convex for
problem (GF). In the following subsection we give an heuristic
which is applicable for both the problems, (TF) and (GF).
B. A Greedy Heuristic
A greedy heuristic can be used for the non-convex prob-
lem (22) and its version for problem (GF). In this greedy
heuristic we choose one node per step of the algorithm. At
each step we choose the node that causes the highest reduction
in the total cost of maintaining the state at equilibrium to in-
clude into the set of controllable nodes. Algorithm 1 describes
this heuristic formally for problem (TF). The algorithm for
problem (GF) will be similar except for a minor change in lines
8–10 that are shown in Algorithm 2. For Algorithms 1 and 2,
there might arise a situation in which the inner procedure
has no solution for some intermediate step. In this case, via
Assumption 2 it will help to start the first iteration with a node
which ensures the existence of an equilibrium, when added to
a set of controllable nodes.
VI. MAX MIN OPTIMAL CONTROL
To solve the problem (MF), we need to define the following
two system variables in addition to x(t) ∈ Rn, the opinion at
each of the nodes at time t.
• r(t) ∈ R is the record of ψ(x(·)) up to time t, i.e., it is
the minimum value of ψ(x(·)) till time t− 1. Formally,
r(t) =
{
ψ(x(0)) t = 0
min0≤τ≤t−1 ψ(x(τ)) t = 1, . . . , T,
(24)
8Algorithm 1: Greedy heuristic for controllable node se-
lection for problem (TF)
Input: (A, q, τ,m, n)
Output: Set of controllable nodes
1 Let C be the set of controllable nodes
2 C = ∅ \\ initialization
3 for i← 1 to m do
4 ni = arg min
j∈N\C
equilibrium cost(C ∪ {j})
5 C ← C ∪ ni \\ greedy update
6 end
1 Procedure equilibrium_cost(S)
2 B = 0m×n
3 i = 1 \\ counter variable
4 for j ∈ S do
5 B(j, i) = 1 \\ designing B using S
6 i = i+ 1
7 end
8 minimize ‖ue‖22
9 subject to
{
xe = Axe +Bue + (In −A)q
xe ≥ τ
10 return ‖ue‖22
Algorithm 2: Lines 8–10 in Algorithm 1 should be
replaced by this segment to obtain the m controllable
nodes for problem (GF) using the greedy heuristic.
1 minimize
u
JGF (x¯, u) =
∑T−1
t=0 ‖u(t)‖22
2 subject to

state dynamics (4),
state constraints (8)
x(0) = x¯ ∈ Rn (given).
3 return JGF (x¯, u)
• y(t) ∈ R, is the running sum of the control cost till time
t− 1, i.e.,
y(t) =
{
0 t = 0∑t−1
τ=0 c(u(τ)) t = 1, . . . , T,
(25)
subject to the budget constraint, imposed by the boundary
condition
y(T ) ≤ C. (26)
We can see that problem (MF) is equivalent to maximizing
r(T ) subject to the budget constraint y(T ) ≤ C and the given
initial conditions. Thus we can use x(t), r(t), and y(t) as the
state variables in an optimal control problem. The dynamics
of these state variables will be as follows.
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), u(t)) for t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
r(t+ 1) = min{r(t), ψ(x(t))} for t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
y(t+ 1) = y(t) + c(u(t)) for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
(27)
Observe that the dynamics of the state variable r(t) are
generally not smooth. This implies that the classical PMP
cannot be used to solve the problem (MF).
Optimal control with minimax cost has been studied before;
see [25], the authoritative monograph and the references
therein for a general introduction to the problem and the issues.
Here, we use some recent results on non-smooth PMP obtained
in [26], and develop a numerical technique to solve the optimal
control problem (MF) exactly. The non-smooth PMP solution
based on [26], is discussed in the following subsection.
A. Non-smooth PMP formulation
Consider the problem (MF). Let (x∗(t), r∗(t), y∗(t))Tt=0
and (u∗(t))T−1t=0 be an optimal state-action trajectory that
solves (MF). Define the Hamiltonian
Rn × R× R× Rn × R× R× Rm 3 (ζx, ζr, ζy, ξx, ξr, ξy, µ)
7→ H(ζx, ζr, ζy, ξx, ξr, ξy, µ) := ζᵀx (Aξx +Bµ+ (In −A)q)
+ζr min{ξr, ψ(ξx)}+ ζy(ξy + c(µ)).
Let the adjoint variables be given by (λx(t), λr(t), λy(t))Tt=0.
For ease of notation, we use λ(t) in place of
(λx(t), λr(t), λy(t)) and λxr(t) to denote the tuple
(λx(t), λr(t)). Similarly we use xr∗(t) to denote the
tuple (x∗(t), r∗(t)). The non-smooth PMP asserts that there
exists a sequence (λ(t))Tt=0 that satisfy the following.
• The adjoint variable λ∗(t) does not vanish at any time.
• The state dynamics follow
x∗(t+ 1) =
∂
∂ζx
H(λ∗(t), x∗(t), r∗(t), y∗(t), u∗(t))
r∗(t+ 1) =
∂
∂ζr
H(λ∗(t), x∗(t), r∗(t), y∗(t), u∗(t))
y∗(t+ 1) =
∂
∂ζy
H(λ∗(t), x∗(t), r∗(t), y∗(t), u∗(t))
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
(28)
• The adjoint dynamics [26] follow
λy(t− 1) = ∂
∂ξy
H(λ∗(t), x∗(t), r∗(t), y∗(t), u∗(t))
〈λxr(t− 1), v〉 ≥ DvH(λ∗(t), ·, ·, y∗(t), u∗(t))(xr∗(t))
for all v ∈ Rn+1, for t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
(29)
• The following complementary slackness condition is sat-
isfied.
λy(T )(y
∗(T )− C) = 0; (30)
• The following Hamiltonian maximization condition is
satisfied.
∂
∂µ
H(λ∗(t), x∗(t), r∗(t), y∗(t), u∗(t)) = 0, (31)
i.e., u∗(t) =
1
2λ∗y(T )
R−1Bᵀλ∗x(t). (32)
The case of λ∗y(T ) = 0 corresponds to the existence of
singular (or abnormal) control. It must also be noted that
the non-smooth PMP, similar to PMP, is based on first order
conditions and does not guarantee the uniqueness of the
solution obtained. It must be noted here that the non-smooth
9PMP uses directional derivatives to specify the dynamics of
the adjoint variables; see definition below.
Definition 6. ([27], Section 1.4 on page 20) Let g : Rd ×
Rm → Rn be a continuous map. For y ∈ Rm and a vector
v ∈ Rd, we denote by Dvg(·, y)(x) the directional derivative
of g(·, y) along v at x, whenever the following limit exists:
Dvg(·, y)(x) := lim
θ↓0
g(x+ θv, y)− g(x, y)
θ
(33)
Note that the directional derivative above is defined as a
right-hand (one-sided) limit. If g is continuously differentiable,
then Dvg(·, y)(x) = ∂∂xg(x, y).v.
In the following we develop a modified forward-backward
sweep algorithm to find a numerical solution of problem (MF)
satisfying the conditions of the non-smooth PMP. In the next
subsection, we outline the algorithm.
B. Numerical Algorithm
Before we discuss the algorithm, we analyze the directional
derivative of the Hamiltonian for problem (MF). We denote
the ordered pair of vector vx ∈ Rn and scalar vr ∈ R by v,
such that Rn × R 3 v = (vx, vr).
DvH(λ, ·, ·, y, u)(xr)
= lim
θ↓0
H(x+ θvx, r + θvr, y, u)−H(x, r, y, u)
θ
(34)
Here we consider three cases for the the relation between r(t)
and ψ(x(t)) to determine the directional derivatives which will
then give the adjoint dynamics.
• Case 1: for some time instant t = t1, we have
r(t1) < ψ(x(t1)). In this case, the record state r(t1 + 1)
is updated such that r(t1 + 1) = r(t1). The non-smooth
PMP formulation is same as the usual PMP because the
Hamiltonian is differentiable in all the state variables. The
adjoint dynamics at this time instant are given by
λy(t1 − 1) = λy(t1),
λr(t1 − 1) = λr(t1),
λx(t1 − 1) = Aᵀλx(t1).
• Case 2: For some time instant t = t2, we have
r(t2) > ψ(x(t2)). In this case, the record state r(t2+1) is
updated such that r(t2 + 1) = ψ(x(t2)). The non-smooth
PMP formulation is same as the usual PMP because the
Hamiltonian is differentiable in all the state variables. The
adjoint dynamics at this time instant are given by
λy(t2 − 1) = λy(t2),
λr(t2 − 1) = 0,
λx(t2 − 1) = Aᵀλx(t2) + λr(t2) d
dx
ψ(x(t2)).
• Case 3: For some time instant t = t3, we have r(t3) =
ψ(x(t3)). In this case the non-smooth PMP formulation
is not the same as the usual PMP because the Hamiltonian
is not differentiable in all the state variables. Using the
directional derivatives, the adjoint dynamics at the time
instant t3 are given by
λy(t3 − 1) = λy(t3),
〈λr(t3 − 1), vr〉+ 〈λx(t3 − 1), vx〉
≥ DvH(λ(t3), ·, ·, y(t3), u(t3))(xr(t3))
for all vx ∈ Rn and all vr ∈ R.
The directional derivative, in direction v, at the time t3
instant can be given by:
λᵀx(t3)Avx + λr(t3) min
{〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
, vr
}
.
(35)
A proof of (35) is in Appendix B.
The adjoint dynamics are:
λy(t3 − 1) = λy(t3),
〈λr(t3 − 1), vr〉+ 〈λx(t3), vx〉
≥ λᵀx(t3)Avx + λr(t3) min
{〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
, vr
}
(36)
for all vx ∈ Rn and all vr ∈ R.
Here we consider the following two possibilities:〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
≥ vr,〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
< vr.
We need λx(t3 − 1) and λr(t3 − 1) to be such that (36)
is satisfied for both the above stated possibilities. We use
the following values of λx(t3 − 1) and λr(t3 − 1):
λx(t3 − 1) = Aᵀλx(t3) + φλr(t3) d
dx
ψ(x(t3)),
λr(t3 − 1) = (1− φ)λr(t3),
for some φ ∈ [0, 1].
(37)
We now verify that this indeed satisfies (36).
When
〈
d
dxψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
> vr, (36) reduces to:
〈λr(t3 − 1), vr〉+ 〈λx(t3 − 1), vx〉
≥ λᵀx(t3)Avx + λr(t3)vr. (38)
Using the adjoint dynamics given by (37), we see that
〈λr(t3 − 1), vr〉+ 〈λx(t3 − 1), vx〉 = 〈(1− φ)λr(t3), vr〉
+
〈
Aᵀλx(t3) + φλr(t3)
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
= λᵀx(t3)Avx + (1− φ)λr(t3)vr
+ φλr(t3)
〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
≥ λᵀx(t3)Avx + λr(t3)vr
for all φ ∈ [0,∞] (39)
Thus satisfying (38).
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Now we consider the second case, i.e., when〈
d
dxψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
< vr,. In this case, condition
(36) reduces to:
〈λr(t3 − 1), vr〉+ 〈λx(t3 − 1), vx〉
≥ λᵀx(t3)Avx + λr(t3)
〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
. (40)
From the adjoint dynamics in (37), we see that
〈λr(t3 − 1), vr〉+ 〈λx(t3 − 1), vx〉 = 〈(1− φ)λr(t3), vr〉
+
〈
Aᵀλx(t3) + φλr(t3)
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
= λᵀx(t3)Avx + (1− φ)λr(t3)vr
+ φλr(t3)
〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
≥ λᵀx(t3)Avx + λr(t3)
〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
for all φ ∈ (−∞, 1], (41)
thus satisfying (40). To satisfy both (38) and (40), we
restrict φ to the interval [0, 1]. The exact value of φ
is determined by the algorithm to ensure the required
relation between r(t3) and ψ(x(t)).
The detailed algorithm is described in Algorithm 3. The
value of the adjoint variable λy(T ) is determined by the shoot-
ing method, implemented in the outer loop of Algorithm 3,
such that the complementary slackness conditions (30) are
satisfied.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we report the results from a subset of
the extensive numerical experiments that we performed. For
the (TF) problem, we first study the performance of our
algorithm to choose the controllable nodes and compare it
against some natural heuristics. We show that our algorithm
is better. We then study the effect on the cost of maintaining
ferment as a function of different parameters—structure of the
network, the threshold level, the number of controllable nodes,
and the stubbornness of the nodes. For all these experiments,
the results for the (GF) problem are qualitatively similar to
that of (TF) and we can draw similar conclusions. Hence we
do not report those results. However, we do study the effect
of parameters a and k on the cost of maintaining ferment and
also analyze the opinion levels at the nodes in the network.
Finally, for the (MF) problem, we study the behavior of the
minimum value that is attained as a function of the budget.
The setup for the experiments is as follows. For all the
experiments, the influence matrix A is such that the sum of
each row of A is 0.9, making it sub-stochastic. Further, each
agent places equal weight5 on its opinion and that of each
of its neighbors. This means that for any node i and each of
its neighbors j, aii = aji = 0.9/(Ni + 1) where Ni is the
number of in-neighbors of i. The initial opinions are taken
as x¯ = 0.5 and the quiescent level is set to q = 0 such that
5The experiments studying the effect of node stubbornness in VII-A5 do not
follow this rule.
Algorithm 3: Numerical algorithm to solve the maxmin
ferment problem
Input: A,B,Budget, x¯, ε1, ε2, w, µ
Output: Optimal state-action trajectory (x∗, u∗)
1 Set: λx(T ) = 0, λr(T ) = 1.
2 Initialize: λ(0)y (T ) = 1.
3 repeat
4 Initialize: u(0) = 0.
5 repeat
6 Forward Sweep: Find x(j) using u(j) via (27).
7 Backward Sweep:
8 u˜ = Backward
(
λx(T ), λr(T ), λ
(p)
y (T ), x(j)
)
9 u(j+1) = wu(j) + (1− w)u˜
10 until j∗such that
∥∥u(j∗) − u(j∗−1)∥∥
F
< ε1
11 Expenditure =
∑T−1
t=0 c
(
u(j
∗)(t)
)
12 λ
(p+1)
y (T ) = λ
(p)
y (T )− µ(Expenditure−Budget)
13 until p∗such that
∣∣∣λ(p∗)y (T )− λ(p∗−1)y (T )∣∣∣ < ε2
14 u∗ = u(j
∗), x∗ from u∗ via (27).
15 Procedure Backward(λx(T ), λr(T ), λ
(p)
y (T ), x(j))
16 for τ ← T − 1 to 0 do
17 Find φ such that ψ(x(τ)) = ψ(x(τ + 1)),
18 with adjoint dynamics (37) and control (32).
19 if φ > 1 then
20 λx(τ) =
Aᵀλx(τ + 1) + λr(τ + 1)
〈
d
dxψ(x(τ + 1))
〉
21 λr(τ) = 0
22 λy(τ) = λy(τ + 1)
23 else if φ < 0 then
24 λx(τ) = A
ᵀλx(τ + 1)
25 λr(τ) = λr(τ + 1)
26 λy(τ) = λy(τ + 1)
27 else
28 λx(τ) =
Aᵀλx(τ + 1) + φλr(τ + 1)
〈
d
dxψ(x(τ + 1))
〉
29 λr(τ) = (1− φ)λr(τ + 1)
30 λy(τ) = λy(τ + 1)
31 end
32 u˜(τ) = 1
2λ
(p)
y (T )
R−1Bᵀλx(τ)
33 end
34 return u˜
the opinion recedes to zero in the absence of external control.
The threshold level τi is set to 0.7 for all i. The system is
studied for T = 100 time steps and the threshold level is
enforced from T0 = 10 onwards. For all the experiments,
we take the matrix R in the cost function (5) to be the
identity matrix Im. We use the open source software CasADi
[28] for numerical simulations. The state-action trajectories
obtained from CasADi are verified to satisfy the necessary
conditions obtained using PMP in Section III. Our experiments
are performed on three kinds of random networks, each with
n = 50 nodes—the Erdo˝s-Re`nyi (ER) graphs [29], Baraba`si-
Albert (BA) graphs [30], and k-regular graphs (kR). Finally,
the results are averaged over 100 realizations of the random
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network topology. The standard deviations in the results are
also indicated on the plots. The height of the bar on one side
of the point is equal to the standard deviation in 100 random
realizations.
It must noted that the initial conditions of the states are
not crucial to the results of the simulation tests. As seen
earlier in the paper, the equilibrium state-control trajectories
are independent of the initial conditions. For T large in
comparison to T0, the initial conditions have negligible effect
on the total costs of maintaining ferment.
A. Total Ferment (TF)
We begin by studying the impact of several model param-
eters on the cost of the (TF) problem.
1) Choosing controllable nodes: Social network literature
provides several notions of centrality and we investigate the
performance when such ‘central nodes’ are used as control-
lable nodes. We consider two such criteria
• Nodes with high out-degrees are clearly more influential
than those with lower out-degrees. Degree centers of a
graph is the set of nodes with the highest out-degree.
• Nodes that are close to a large number of nodes can
propagate a control signal quicker than others. Distance
center of a graph is the set of nodes that have the
minimum eccentricity (largest hop-distance from the node
to any other node).
We compare the cost of maintaining ferment when the set
of m controllable nodes are chosen to be the degree centers,
the distance centers, and chosen using the convex relaxation
described in Section V-A and using the greedy algorithm
described in Section V-B. Finding the distance center is in
general NP-hard, and we instead use a greedy approximation
algorithm [31]. The results for the three kinds of random
networks, each with n = 50 nodes and an average degree
of 6, are tabulated in Tables I–Table III.
Method m = 2 m = 4 m = 6 m = 8 m = 10
Greedy 174.94 95.90 71.01 58.13 48.81
Convex 181.38 105.45 83.67 72.31 65.08
Degree centers 180.36 102.18 76.79 63.33 54.69
Distance centers 1392.05 707.10 478.16 358.00 287.09
TABLE I
COST OF MAINTAINING FERMENT IN BA NETWORKS.
Method m = 2 m = 4 m = 6 m = 8 m = 10
Greedy 607.18 276.57 181.24 136.59 110.15
Convex 669.55 311.03 195.97 142.31 120.44
Degree centers 680.96 325.52 216.67 166.65 137.98
Distance centers 3730.61 1606.88 921.27 626.96 451.36
TABLE II
COST OF MAINTAINING FERMENT IN A ER NETWORKS.
From the Tables I–Table III, we see that the greedy al-
gorithm performs the best in all cases. It is also observed
that the distance centres performs very poorly for the BA
and ER graphs, while its performance is comparable to the
other heuristics for the kR graph. One reason why distance
centres perform so badly for the BA and ER graphs is that it
Method m = 2 m = 4 m = 6 m = 8 m = 10
Greedy 1535.32 645.99 397.86 284.13 220.00
Convex 2003.55 825.47 481.33 326.47 251.48
Degree centers 1961.74 817.46 502.07 346.07 261.73
Distance centers 1811.33 761.41 471.87 336.70 256.54
TABLE III
COST OF MAINTAINING FERMENT IN kR NETWORKS.
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Fig. 5. Cost of maintaining ferment as a function of average degree.
sometimes fails to pick the nodes with the larger out-degrees,
which can have large influence in the network. In the kR
graphs, this heuristic is good because all nodes have equal
out-degrees. On the other hand, the degree centers heuristic
picks the nodes with the highest out-degrees and thus performs
fairly well. However, it is not the best scheme as it does
not account for the distance to other nodes while selecting
the controllable nodes. The convex relaxation heuristic also
performs comparably to the degree centers but not as good as
the greedy heuristic. Given these results, in all of the following
experiments, we will use the greedy algorithm for selecting the
controllable nodes.
2) Effect of Network Structure: Here we study the variation
of the cost of maintaining ferment with the average degree
and the degree distribution of the network. The variation in
the degree distributions is provided by the different networks.
For each given average degree, we consider the BA graphs
with the power law degree distribution, the Erdo˝s-Re`nyi (ER)
graphs [29] with binomial degree distribution and the random
regular graphs with constant degree. Each network consists
of n = 50 nodes with m = 5 controllable nodes, chosen
according to the greedy heuristic presented in Section V-B.
We plot the results in Fig. 5.
From Fig. 5, we see that it is cheaper to maintain ferment
in a network with a higher average degree but the marginal
gain decreases rather rapidly with increasing degree. This is to
be expected since once the graph is fairly well-connected, all
nodes are easily accessible and increasing the degree further
has minimal benefit. For a given average degree, we also see
that the cost is the least for the BA network and and highest
for kR graphs, indicating that the presence of nodes with high
degrees makes it easier to maintain the ferment.
3) Effect of Threshold Value: In Fig. 6, we plot the cost
of maintaining ferment as a function of the threshold τ. The
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Fig. 6. Cost of maintaining ferment as a function of desired ferment level.
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Fig. 7. Cost of maintaining ferment as a function of the number of controllable
nodes.
cost is approximately quadratic with respect to τ. This is to
be expected since the cost function is a quadratic. In keeping
with the finding from the previous experiment, the cost is
highest in the kR graphs and lowest for BA graphs. The effect
of the degree distribution is noteworthy with significant cost
reductions being obtained when there are a few nodes with
large degrees as in the BA graph.
4) Number of Controllable Nodes: Fig. 7 shows the cost
of maintaining ferment as a function of m, the number
of controllable nodes. Note that the cost is plotted on a
logarithmic scale indicating that the reduction in cost is quite
steep. This sharp reduction in cost is due to two reasons: firstly,
as the cost function for control inputs is convex, having to
apply smaller control inputs at a larger number of controllable
nodes decreases the total cost. The second reason is that having
a larger number of controllable nodes decreases the average
distance of nodes from a controllable node, thus helping
reduce the control inputs required to influence the most remote
nodes.
5) Effect of Stubbornness: Recall that in (1), aii denotes
the stubbornness of node i. We now study its effect on the
cost of maintaining ferment. In the first set of experiments we
assume that aii is the same for all i. The aji are calculated
as before, i.e., aji = (0.9 − aii)/Ni where Ni is the number
of in-neighbors of i. Fig. 8 plots the cost as a function of aii.
We see that the cost increases very rapidly with an increase in
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Fig. 8. Cost of maintaining ferment as a function of the stubbornness of
agents when all the agents are stubborn.
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Fig. 9. Cost of maintaining total ferment: 80% agents have aii = 0, plot of
cost vs aii of stubborn nodes.
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Fig. 10. Cost of maintaining ferment as a function of the number of stubborn
agents; aii = 0.7 for each stubborn agent.
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the stubbornness of the agents in the network. This indicates
that a thorough understanding of the population stubbornness
is vital before starting a campaign for maintaining ferment on
a topic for a certain period of time.
Next, we repeat this experiment except that now only a
fraction (20%) of the nodes are stubborn, chosen at random
from the network. The cost of maintaining ferment as a
function of aii is plotted in Fig. 9. Here the results are very
different from the case of all agents being stubborn. The cost
first decreases with the level of stubbornness aii and then
increases. The decrease can be explained as the stubborn nodes
are good candidates for controllable nodes. The increase, seen
for a very high level of stubbornness is because of those
stubborn nodes which were not chosen as controllable nodes.
Recall that in this experiment, there are m = 5 controllable
nodes and 10 stubborn nodes.
We also perform another variation of this experiment with
a varying fraction of the agents being stubborn. The stub-
bornness of the stubborn agents is set to aii = 0.7, and
the number of stubborn agents is varied from 0 to 50. The
results of this experiment are in Fig. 10. It can be seen that
the cost of maintaining ferment is smallest when the number
of stubborn nodes is 5 for all three types of networks. This is
equal to the number of controllable nodes, m = 5 and stubborn
nodes make good controllable nodes. This is backed by the
observation that when the number of stubborn nodes is 5, on
average, 4.19, 4.52, and 4.97 controllable nodes are stubborn
in the ER, BA, and kR graphs respectively. The cost increases
with increasing number of stubborn nodes, beyond 5. This is
because these additional stubborn nodes are not controllable
and thus they lead to a higher cost of maintaining ferment.
B. Group Ferment (GF)
We will now consider the (GF) problem. For all the exper-
iments conducted above, the results for the (GF) problem are
qualitatively similar to that of (TF) and we can draw similar
conclusions. Hence we do not report those results. We will
instead study the effect of parameters a and k on the cost of
maintaining group ferment.
1) Effect of a and k: Recall that a is the slope parameter
of the sigmoid function and k is the fraction that determines
the level of group ferment to be maintained. As before, we
take the number of nodes in the network to be n = 50, the
average degree is set to 6, and the threshold parameter τ is
set to 0.7. The system is observed for T = 100 time steps and
the setup time T0 = 10. The number of controllable nodes is
m = 5 and they are chosen by using the greedy heuristic. As
before, the results are averaged over 100 realizations of the
network topology. In Tables IV, V, and VI, we tabulate the
average cost of maintaining group ferment as a function of
the parameters a : slope of sigmoid function and k : the level
of group ferment desired. We do this experiment for the ER,
BA, and kR graphs.
In Tables IV, V, and VI, note that the cost is increasing with
increase in the parameter k. This is to be expected because
a larger value of k implies a stricter ferment requirement.
For most values of k, the cost decreases with an increase
a ↓ k → 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
1 44.40 115.77 234.56 441.10
3 44.61 65.64 93.92 136.27
5 44.97 57.91 74.24 97.24
7 45.38 55.10 66.95 83.05
10 45.95 53.37 62.09 77.39
TABLE IV
COST OF MAINTAINING GROUP FERMENT IN BA NETWORKS AS A
FUNCTION OF a, SLOPE OF SIGMOID FUNCTION AND k, LEVEL OF DESIRED
GROUP FERMENT.
a ↓ k → 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
1 253.99 681.72 1427.35 2762.23
3 267.60 406.50 594.21 876.89
5 281.17 369.05 477.83 632.44
7 289.95 355.42 433.38 542.56
10 296.80 345.79 403.86 482.92
TABLE V
COST OF MAINTAINING GROUP FERMENT IN kR NETWORKS AS A
FUNCTION OF a, SLOPE OF SIGMOID FUNCTION, AND k, LEVEL OF GROUP
FERMENT DESIRED.
in the slope parameter a. A higher value of a implies that
the sigmoid function used in the group ferment requirement
resembles the step function more closely, which in turn means
that the condition can be satisfied by targeting control on to
a smaller fraction of nodes and ignoring the nodes which are
more difficult to influence. It can also be observed that the
increments in the cost with k are larger for smaller values of
a. This is because a smaller value of a implies that the sigmoid
function has a smaller slope and a larger value of control is
required to achieve the same increase in φ(x(·)).
We also tabulate the average number of nodes whose
opinion values are actually above the threshold at equilibrium
when the control is applied to maintain group ferment. From
Tables VII, VIII, and IX, it can be seen that group ferment can
be obtained by taking a smaller number of nodes above the
threshold for smaller values of k. However for a higher value
of k, the group ferment is ensured only when a larger number
of nodes are above the threshold, and as seen in Tables IV, V,
and VI, this comes at an increased cost. It can be seen that
for some small values of k, a needs to be large to achieve the
objective of having kn nodes above τ.
C. Maxmin Ferment (MF)
Finally, we study the (MF) problem. Specifically, we plot the
maxmin ferment level attained as a function of the available
budget. The underlying graph has n = 50 nodes and the
average degree is 6. The threshold parameter τ is set to 0.7.
The system is observed for T = 100 time steps. The initial
a ↓ k → 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
1 114.06 301.50 622.50 1195.90
3 106.94 160.59 234.19 344.85
5 109.76 144.22 187.78 248.73
7 112.18 138.62 170.57 213.49
10 105.56 124.47 146.59 175.17
TABLE VI
COST OF MAINTAINING GROUP FERMENT IN ER NETWORKS AS A
FUNCTION OF PARAMETERS a, SLOPE OF SIGMOID FUNCTION, AND k,
LEVEL OF GROUP FERMENT DESIRED.
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a ↓ k → 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
1 17.10 50.00 50.00 50.00
3 17.23 44.63 50.00 50.00
5 17.68 39.35 47.41 50.00
7 19.32 36.21 45.13 49.31
10 20.06 34.01 42.24 48.03
TABLE VII
AVERAGE NUMBER OF NODES WITH OPINIONS ABOVE THRESHOLD AT
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE (GF) PROBLEM IN BA NETWORKS, AS A FUNCTION
OF THE PARAMETERS a : SLOPE OF SIGMOID FUNCTION AND k : THE
LEVEL OF GROUP FERMENT DESIRED.
a ↓ k → 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
1 7.54 50.00 50.00 50.00
3 12.70 38.61 50.00 50.00
5 18.51 34.17 48.97 50.00
7 23.11 33.54 44.46 49.91
10 27.03 33.32 37.77 48.74
TABLE VIII
THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF NODES WHICH ARE ACTUALLY ABOVE THE
THRESHOLD AT EQUILIBRIUM IN THE (GF) PROBLEM IN kR NETWORKS,
AS A FUNCTION OF THE PARAMETERS a : SLOPE OF SIGMOID FUNCTION
AND k : THE LEVEL OF GROUP FERMENT DESIRED.
opinion level is set to a high value, x¯i = 2 ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , n]. The
slope parameter a = 0.5. The number of controllable nodes is
m = 5 and they are chosen by the degree centres heuristic. For
this problem, we choose the degree centres heuristic instead
of the greedy heuristic because the greedy heuristic is based
upon the condition that the Turnpike property is present in the
state-control trajectories, which is not true for this problem.
On the other hand, the degree centres heuristic is more general
in definition and scope. The results corresponding to BA,
ER and kR networks are in Fig. 11 where the value of
minimum
t
ψ(x(t)) is plotted as a function of the budget. Each
point on the plot represents the average ferment and average
budget across 50 observations of the random graph topologies.
It can be seen that the ferment is costliest for the kR graph
and cheapest for the BA graph. The results corresponding to
larger values of a could not be attained due to stability issues
of the numerical procedure.
VIII. DISCUSSION
We considered the control problem of influencing opinion
dynamics on a social network to achieve control objectives.
Motivated by ‘mindshare’-like objectives of campaigns, we
were interested in the opinion levels (states) over the entire
control period. We considered two types of problems—a
minimum cost problem with constraints on the allowable
a ↓ k → 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
1 17.66 49.81 50.00 50.00
3 17.58 34.91 45.58 45.83
5 18.83 31.78 41.91 45.75
7 20.49 30.31 38.33 45.35
10 19.26 26.73 32.50 39.77
TABLE IX
THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF NODES WHICH ARE ACTUALLY ABOVE THE
THRESHOLD AT EQUILIBRIUM IN THE (GF) PROBLEM IN ER NETWORKS,
AS A FUNCTION OF THE PARAMETERS a : SLOPE OF SIGMOID FUNCTION
AND k : THE LEVEL OF GROUP FERMENT DESIRED.
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Fig. 11. Ferment level attained as a function of the budget in maxmin problem
for kR, ER, and BA networks.
states in {T0, . . . , T} and a maxmin problem with total cost
constraint.
Several open questions remain even within the problem
space that we considered. Our extensive simulations indicate
that the set of controllable nodes obtained as a solution to the
convex relaxation (23) for both TF and GF is submodular. If
this were the case then the greedy heuristic is within (1−1/e)
of the optimal value. Also, Algorithm 3 that determines the
control function for the maxmin problem has numerical stabil-
ity issues. An algorithm without this deficiency is desirable.
There are of course several variations possible both on the
opinion dynamics, and on the state constraints. We expect that
the key techniques and the results would be along similar
lines. An important class of problems would be to consider
multiple opposing campaigns possibly with different control
nodes. For example, in [32], we have considered two opposing
campaigns in a continuous time SI1SI2S epidemic model
and obtained the Nash control strategies. There are of course
myriad possibilities.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
For only the k-th node controllable, the matrix B ∈ Rn×1
is such that it has the k-th entry 1 and all other entries 0.
Consider the system
minimize ‖ue‖22 (42)
subject to
{
xe = Axe +Bue + (In −A)q
xe ≥ τ. (43)
Rewrite (43) as
(In −A)(xe − q) = Bue, (44)
xe ≥ τ. (45)
It can further be rewritten as
(In −A)xe = pBue, (46)
xe ≥ τ − q. (47)
We will now focus on the matrix (In − A) and its in-
verse. Note that for any matrix M with eigenvalues ΛM =
15
{λ1, λ2, · · · , λn}, the eigenvalues of (In−M) are Λ(In−M) =
{1− λ1, 1− λ2, · · · , 1− λn}.
We know that the eigenvalues λi of A are such that for all
i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, |λi| < 1. This implies that the eigenvalues of
(In −A) are greater than 0. We know that for a non-singular
matrix with the real parts of all its eigenvalues non-negative,
its inverse has all entries non-negative [33, Theorem 1]. Thus
(In −A)−1 has all entries non-negative. That is:
(In −A)−1 < 0. (48)
Now consider the following:
xe = (In −A)−1Bue, (49)
xe ≥ τ − q. (50)
Here, we have that Bue ∈ Rn×1 has only the k-th entry non-
zero. Let the k-th entry of Bue be c > 0. Now, the problem
reduces to:
xe = c[k-th column of (In −A)−1] (51)
xe ≥ τ − q. (52)
The original problem can be re-stated as:
minimize c2 (53)
subject to c[k-th column of (In −A)−1] ≥ τ − q. (54)
It follows from (48) that the above problem has a solution if
the k-th column of (In −A)−1 has no zero entry.
B. Proof of (35)
Here we give a proof that when at time t = t3, r(t3) =
ψ(x(t3)), the directional derivatives in direction v are equal
to (35). From (34), we have
DvH(λ, ·, ·, y, u)(xr)
= lim
θ↓0
H(x+ θvx, r + θvr, y, u)−H(x, r, y, u)
θ
= lim
θ↓0
λᵀx(t3)A(x(t3) + θvx − x(t3))
θ
+ lim
θ↓0
λr(t3)(min{ψ(x(t3)) + θvx, r(t3) + θvr} − r(t3))
θ
= λᵀx(t3)Avx + λr(t3) min
{〈
d
dx
ψ(x(t3)), vx
〉
, vr
}
.
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